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The Ostrich and the Arbitrator: The
Use of Precedent in Arbitration of
Labor-Management Disputes
Alvin B. Rubin* and Elven E. Pondert
The ostrich has often been accused of hiding his head in the
sand when frightened. Presumably he thus avoids seeing the
cause of his fright. Presumably he also avoids seeing what the
other ostriches are doing.
This practice has been recommended to the beginning arbi-
trator in the field of labor-management. Some commentators
advise against looking around to see what other arbitrators are
doing. Arbitration awards, they say, should not be published,
and, if published, should not be used.
There is general, even if not universal, agreement that arbi-
trators in the management-labor field should prepare written
awards, stating their reasons for decision.' The written award
makes the decision less ambiguous. At least, most arbitrators
hope that comprehension will follow, although losers in arbitra-
tion cases, no less than losers of law suits, are apt to find no
solace in the reasons advanced for their loss. 2 More frequently
they appear to find in the reasons advanced greater proof of the
arbitrators' unreasonableness, ignorance or unfairness.
* Member, Baton Rouge Bar; Assistant Professor of Law, part-time,
Louisiana State University.
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1. However, the written opinion is to be preferred and in most labor
cases this is done. The written opinion, an absolute necessity in complex
cases, permits careful study by both parties and is available for future refer-
ence as a guide in subsequent employee-employer negotiations for later and
similar grievance." 5 CCH Lab. Law Rep. 11 54,005 (1952). Cf. American Arbi-
tration Association, Code of Ethics and Procedural Standards for Arbitrators,
5 CCH Lab. Law Rep. 54,100, § 5d. "The award should be personally signed
by the arbitrator .. "
2. Updegraff & McCoy, The Arbitration of Labor Disputes 115 (1946),
suggests that "After a lapse of a week or two when the parties, as well as the
arbitrator, have had a chance to reflect on the evidence, the losing party will
realize that he deserved to lose, and the decision will come as no surprise,
particularly if it is sound and convincing as an oral opinion cannot be."
[208)
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But arbitrators will continue to try to explain the decision
and to try to make the parties understand it.3 This being true,
the first question is whether their awards should be published in
some fashion so that others may read them. There are at least a
few loud "No's."
The opponents of the publication of awards argue that each
case is unique, each award is unique, and that the sole standard
of the arbitrator is justice. The atmosphere of the court and the
use of precedent can do untold harm. "The fact of publication
itself creates the atmosphere of precedent. '4 Therefore, let the
company, the union, and the arbitrator each carefully file the
award in some secret place where it can do no further damage.
Despite the fear that arbitration awards may be misused,
if published, there nevertheless exists a strong enough demand
for knowledge of awards to justify commercial publication. Arbi-
trators, management, and unions subscribe to the services which
publish these awards. Presumably they use them. But publica-
tion is justified also by a growing opinion that publication is
wise.5
Such opinion recognizes that the publication of awards is
beneficial in at least four phases of the collective bargaining
relationship:
(1) Negotiation of new or renewal contracts;
(2) Drafting of appropriate clauses;
(3) Handling disputes in the grievance procedure;
(4) Preparation and presentation of cases before an arbi-
trator.6
3. Procedural Standards for Arbitrators, 5 CCH Lab. Law Rep. 1 54,100,
§ 5a: "... . The award should be definite, certain and final, and should dispose
of all matters submitted."
Cf. (e): "It is discretionary with the arbitrator to state reasons for his
decision or to accompany the award with an opinion. Opinions should not
contain gratuitous advice or comments not related or necessary to the deter-
mination of the issues. If either party requests the arbitrator to prepare an
opinion, such request should be followed."
4. Cherne, Should Arbitration Awards Be Published? 1 (N.S.) The Arbi-
tration Journal 75 (1946).
5. See Levenstein, Some Obstacles To Reporting Labor Arbitration, 1(N.S.) The Arbitration Journal 425 (1946); Taylor, Reporting of Labor Arbi-
tration: Pro and Con, 1 (N.S.) The Arbitration Journal 420 (1946); Simkin &
Kennedy, Arbitration of Grievances, U.S. Dept. of Labor Bull. No. 82 (1946);
Updegraff and McCoy, Arbitration of Labor Disputes (1946); Xellor, Arbi-
tration in Action (1941).
6. See Justin, An Arbitrator Speaks on the Use of Reported Awards,
Labor Relations Reporter for Dec. 29, 1947. See also, the discussion in
Reporting of Labor Arbitration: Pro and Con, 1 (N.S.) The Arbitration
Journal 420 (1946).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
By reference to the interpretations given clauses contained
in other agreements, union and management can determine an
appropriate form into which to put their own agreement in order
to achieve their true intention. In handling disputes in the griev-
ance procedure, an award made elsewhere may be of influence
in assisting management and labor to dispose of the grievance
by agreement. If a dispute does proceed to arbitration, prior
awards can be used to strengthen the presentation of the case.7
Publication, right or wrong, is now a fact. The best use of
published awards is the next field of battle. The general state-
ment that "stare decisis has no part in arbitration" is obvi-
ously true.8 Stare decisis is a doctrine formulated by the courts
of the common law to meet the needs of that particular legal
system. As such, it should be no more transplanted bodily into the
arbitration system than should technical rules of courtroom
procedure.
Does it necessarily follow, however, that there is no value
to arbitration awards as precedents?
Various arguments have been advanced for using arbitration
awards as precedents; some see an advantage in making use of
accumulated experience, now that published awards are avail-
ableY Others point to the relative inexperience of many arbi-
trators, and to the waste of time and effort incident to ignoring
the reasoning of prior awards. In addition it is urged that by the
use of precedent awards become more predictable and the num-
ber of cases arbitrated will thereby be reduced.
Those who oppose the use of awards as precedent emphasize
the danger of formalization of the arbitration process. They fear
that the arbitration process will shift to a question of the dili-
gence of counsel in ferreting out all the precedents. Contract
negotiations will in their opinion suffer from a "legalistic" atmos-
phere thus created. Arbitration might degenerate from a method
for maintaining good relations between parties that must con-
7. Ibid.
8. Procedural Standards for Arbitrators, 5 CCH Lab. Law Rep. 1 54,100,
§ 4(f): "The arbitrator is expected to exercise his own best judgment. He is
not required except by specific agreement of the parties to follow precedent.
He should not, however, prevent the parties from presenting the decisions of
other arbitrators, in support of their positions. When the parties have selected
a continuing arbitrator, it is generally recognized that he may establish or
follow precedents for the same parties."
9. One set of arbitration reports alone now has run through 18 volumes,
with an estimated 250 cases per volume.
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tinue the relationship to a means for obtaining a ruling on the
right and wrong between two antagonists.10
It will perhaps assist in evaluating the force of these argu-
ments if we examine the situations in which the use of precedent
might be urged:
1. An arbitration between two parties who have had a prior
arbitration on the same subject arising under the same
working agreement or under a prior working agreement
which has been renewed without change.
2. An arbitration between two parties under either of the
situations presented above, when the prior decision, while
not on the precise point in controversy, is relevant in some
fashion.
3. An arbitration between two parties who have had no prior
determination of the issue but who seek to influence the
arbitrator by citation of published awards in cases arising
between other parties.
In the first situation, where the question of the effect of a
prior decision between the same parties has been presented,
most arbitrators seem inclined to follow the prior award. Some
consider it binding." Others say it is "persuasive.' 12 In a few
10. See McPherson, Should Labor Arbitrators Play Follow-The-Leader, IV
(N.S.) The Arbitration Journal 163 (1949).
11. In re Pan American Refining Corp., 9 L.A. 731 (1948), Whitley P.
McCoy; In re Tennessee Coal, Iron and R.R. Co., 6 L.A. 426 (1945), Blumer,
Maurice and Kelly; In re Warren City Mfg. Co., 7 L.A. 202 (1947), Byron R.
Abernathy.
See also the following cases dealing with an intervening new agreement
containing the same clause involved in a prior arbitration, and applying the
earlier Interpretation as binding: In re Swift & Co., 11 L.A. 259 (1948),
James J. Healy; In re Atlantic & Gulf Coast Shippers, 9 L.A. 632 (1948),
Fredrick R. Livingston. Contra: In re North American Aviation, Inc., 15'L.A.
626 (1950), Michael I. Komaroff.
12. In re General Electric Company, 9 L.A. 757 (1948), Saul Wallen;
In re Gorton-Pew Fisheries Co., 16 L.A. 365 (1951), Saul Wallen; In re Roberts
Numbering Machine Co., 9 L.A. 861 (1948), I. Robert Feinberg.
In re Armour & Co., 11 L.A. 186 (1948), Harold M. Gilden. A dispute
had arisen under a prior contract concerning the interpretation of a clause
in that contract. The dispute was submitted to arbitration. Thereafter the
same clause was adopted in a new contract. On the issue of interpretation
of the clause in the new contract, the arbitrator said, "There is no question
that on appeal, or in appropriate resubmission, the arbitrator does have the
power to supersede or modify his own award or the award of some other
arbitrator. The arbitrator is free to make such a determination as he deems
proper, and may either affirm, reverse, or modify the previous ruling. The
prior award alone, although possibly of some persuasive value, would not be
binding on him. The Ker, decision has importance in the instant case, not
because it is a precedent, or because it is right or wrong, or because this
arbitrator would have ruled the same way, but because it is obvious that the
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reported awards, arbitrators have refused to follow the prior
award.13
In such a situation, if the prior award is of no value, then
the parties can, in the hope of ultimate success, rearbitrate each
recurrence of the very same dispute endlessly during the term of
a single agreement. While arbitration is a part of the science of
jurisprudence, 1 4 it is also a part of the administration of working
agreements. From the standpoint of either justice or of sound
administration, a decision, once reached, should be operative at
least until the parties affected change their agreement, 15 which
usually occurs at least every two years, if for no other reason
than to meet the requirements of the National Labor Relations
Board.'6 There is ample and recurring opportunity to rewrite the
agreement and thus to change the law between the parties.
Mr. Whitley P. McCoy's remarks in one award" seem to sum
up fairly the position that, as between the immediate parties, a
decision in one case should bind the parties in a later case. He
parties have contracted on the basis of the meaning which that decision
gives to one of the contract terms." (Italics supplied.)
See also, In re 0 & S Bearing Co., 12 L.A. 132 (1949), Russell A. Smith.
Interpretation of seniority provisions was involved. The company argued
that the arbitrator was not "bound" by a prior award because different
employees were involved. Mr. Smith said, "While I am not technically
bound . . . a proper regard for the arbitration process and for stability in
collective bargaining relations would, in my opinion, require me to accept and
apply in this case any interpretation of the parties' contractual relations
which was presented to the arbitrator for decision and decided by him, even
though I might independently disagree with his decision."
13. In re North American Aviation, Inc., 15 L.A. 626 (1950), Michael I.
Komaroff; In re Witton Woolen Co., 8 L.A. 355 (1947), James J. Healy.
14. Fundamentally, arbitration is a part of the science of jurisprudence.
Whatever its differences from the traditional courtroom process, It none-
theless involves the problems incident to judging the merits of a case in
which there are at least two sides. Every system of jurisprudence has started
without precedents; arbitration of labor-management disputes was no excep-
tion. But in every known system of jurisprudence, as the system matured
and precedents accumulated, they were used. However, in arbitration, a
newcomer in American jurisprudence, the argument is presented that prece-
dents should not be permitted to accumulate and, if accumulated, they should
not be used, and finally, if used, they should be given minimal effect.
15. It has been urged that courts overrule themselves, and therefore
arbitrators should be free to do so. (See discussion in Abelow, Arbitration of
Labor Disputes-Some Practical Aspects, 14 Brooklyn L. Rev. 28 [1947];
Cherne, Should Arbitration Awards Be Published, 1 [N.S.] The Arbitration
Journal 75 [1946]; Syme, The Function of Arbitrators' Opinions, 6 The Arbi-
tration Journal 103 [1951]; Note, 1949 Wash. U.L.Q. 71 [1949].) But courts
seldom, if ever, have the opportunity to overrule themselves as to the same
parties. On the other hand, a court decision in a case involving one group
of parties may become a precedent for other parties in the unforeseeable
future.
16. Reed Roller Bit, 72 NLRB 927 (1947).
17. In re Pan American Refining Corp., 9 L.A. 731 (1948).
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states that another arbitrator's decision of a dispute involving
another company and union should not be binding but at most
persuasive. But he says that when the same parties are involved
in a dispute concerning the identical contractual provision, "every
principle of common sense, policy, and labor relations demands
that . . [the arbitrator's decision] stand until the parties
annul it by a newly worded contract provision." Otherwise,
"every week or two the parties would find themselves arbitrating
the same question, each time with a new arbitrator. 1 8
Where a prior award between the same parties is relevant,
but not precisely in point, obviously the prior award is in no
sense "binding." Should it be cited, however, sound administra-
tion would dictate that it be given consideration. Arbitration is
usually part of a continuing process of labor relations. It serves
its function in this regard only if it assists in just and harmonious
adjustment of differences. Some consistency seems desirable in
any administrative process. Therefore, in principle, the prior
award under these circumstances should be considered persua-
sive. However, if impelling reasons for disregarding it exist, it
should not be followed. An "impelling reason" would be any
reason strong enough to overcome the undesirable effects of
inconsistency indicated above.
The third situation suggested presents the nub of the prob-
lem which appears to bother most arbitrators when they discuss
the use of precedent in arbitration.
An arbitrator is presented with a case between A Union and
B Corporation. One of the parties cites an award by Blinkey
Smith in a case arising in Podunk. Of course, the arbitrator, if he
does not wish to follow the cited decision, can either ignore it
completely or point out that Smith is an idiot. Only the first
alternative is available if the party has been astute enough to
find a prior award which seems in point, made not by Blinkey
Smith, but the self-same arbitrator now serving, unless he is bold
enough to say in effect that he was an idiot but not an irretriev-
able one.
A middle ground on the subject has been stated by Aaron
Levenstein: 19
"Arbitrators must concentrate on the particular facts and
18. Ibid.
19. Levenstein, Some Obstacles to Reporting Labor Arbitration, 1 (N.S.)
The Arbitration Journal 425, 427 (1946).
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all the surrounding circumstances of the case before them.
Any attempt to divert them to an emphasis on how other
arbitrators decided when confronted with like situations
would defeat the very objective of arbitration. It would pre-
vent the arbitrator from finding an "out" which may be
necessary in order to enable the parties to live together under
the contract for the balance of the term. To be sure, the
arbitrator will be interested in the decisions of others, but
his interest will lie in the process of decision, not the result.
He will be concerned with the reasoning of other arbitrators,
with their approach. He may guide his own mental processes
on that basis, but he will not read the awards of others for
the purpose of duplicating them in the situations presented
to him.
"In other words, the arbitrator may want the texts of
other arbitrators' decisions as part of his general, professional
culture. He will not lean on them as instruments for the
making of his own awards. .. ." (Italics supplied.)
Mr. Levenstein's analysis presupposes that arbitrators will
consider what others have done, not as a matter of following
blindly in the path, but as a matter of determining the general
area of travel. Such an analysis would also make proper the con-
sideration of prior awards cited by the parties.20
Most of the writers on the use of arbitration awards as prece-
dent have emphasized the differences between the common law,
with its doctrine of stare decisis, and the arbitration process. If
there is still another view, perhaps it can find its root in another
system of law.
The civil law long ago rejected the doctrine of stare decisis.
With a codal text as the basic law, and the judicial decision
20. Those who urge complete disregard of what arbitrators have done in
other cases between other parties say usually that no two contracts are
precisely alike. This is obviously true in some industries, although in others
the growth of well-organized national unions has led to nationwide use of
virtually identical contract clauses. Any competent arbitrator should be
able to distinguish the case which is not relevant because the contract is
different.
This same school points out that the informality and the search for
justice alone-basic virtues of the arbitration process-may fail if awards by
arbitrators in other cases are used as precedent. These virtues admittedly
are of the essence of the arbitration process. But some arbitrators have felt
that, if the arbitrator's award is to be successful in stabilizing labor relations,
it must fall within the "area of expectancy of the parties." This area of
expectancy may well be bounded north, south, east and west by what other
arbitrators have done in other published awards.
[VOL. XIII
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merely an application of that basic law to a given set of facts,
the civilian jurists accepted as a basic tenet the idea that no
single prior judicial decision had binding force. Justice was to be
sought anew in each case, although here justice usually meant the
proper interpretation of the code rather than a matter of con-
science.
But as decisions on a particular well-defined problem multi-
plied, the doctrine of jurisprudence constante was developed.2 1
If there was a widely developed and uniform series of decisions
interpreting a particular codal provision in its application to a
specific factual situation, then that course of decision should be
followed by another court considering the same problem. Here
there is no theory of the binding force of decision. The basic
idea rather is that what has become settled through constant and
uniform interpretation should be followed in the absence of
impelling contrary reasons in the particular case.
Perhaps jurisprudence constante will offer an answer in the
field of arbitration as the number of decisions grows and as the
contract problems become of more frequent occurrence.22
Certainly, isolated awards between other parties are entitled
to no greater weight than a competent appraisal of their rele-
vance and logical force justifies. But if a wide and uniform
pattern of interpreting particular contract words and clauses
develops, then the individual arbitrator may well consider follow-
ing the pattern. In such event, the parties will doubtless, if well
informed, have an idea, in using particular clauses, how the clause
in question has been interpreted. Consistent interpretation then
would not imply legalism or formality but rather the avoidance
of making everyone out of step but Jim-unless, of course, Jim
had good reason to start off on his right foot. The arbitration
process would afford ample opportunity for Jim to present that
good reason if it exists.
The accumulation of published awards has not yet reached
the stage where such a suggestion is practicable. Because of the
flexibility, individuality and independence of the arbitration
process, there may never be any area of labor-management con-
tract interpretation where the course of arbitration awards will
be constant long enough to apply such a doctrine. One notable
21. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert and McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A
Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 Tulane L. Rev. 14 (1937).
22. It has been suggested that this sort of pattern has already evolved in
discipline and discharge cases. Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (1948).
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weakness which occurs immediately is the fact that published
awards probably represent only a fraction of the awards actually
made. For various reasons, many of those who become parties to
arbitration prefer that awards be withheld from publication. And
of course no award should be made available for publication
unless all the parties consent. 23 One of the authors has served as
arbitrator in twenty-one cases in the last two years. Only one of
these awards has been published; and in cases in which he has
served as counsel for parties to an arbitration proceeding, less
than one-fourth of the awards has been published.
Yet, despite the small portion of awards actually published,
and notwithstanding all the arguments that have been mustered
against the consideration of awards in other cases, a recent survey
indicates that most of those concerned in the arbitration process
feel that some weight should be given to a consideration of the
published awards. 24 In Volume 16 of Labor Arbitration Reports,
23. 5 CCH Lab. Law Rep. 1 54,100. Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, Rule
18(b): ". . . publication or public disclosures should be only with the parties'
consent."
24. Warren and Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 Labor Rela-
tions Review No. 2 (January 1951), reprinted in 16 L.A. 970 (1951), report the
results of a survey to be as follows:
TABLE IX
Participant Decisive Weight Some Weight No Weight
Management 7 66 27
Union 19 59 22
Arbitrator 2 77 21
All 7 70 23
John W. Taylor, Reporting of Labor Arbitration, 1 (N.S.) The Arbitration
Journal 420 (1946): "Although it is frequently said that precedents have no
place in arbitration, few arbitrators would object to obtaining hints in decid-
ing a doubtful issue from other awards which appeared to be thoughtfully
and fairly reasoned"; Smith, Labor Law, Cases and Materials 1162 (1950):
if the factors are enough alike, "it might be that the prior award will have
some and perhaps strong persuasive force"; Updegraff and McCoy, Arbitra-
tion of Labor Disputes 129 (1946): ". . . Obviously, previous well-considered
decisions, if presented, will be persuasive, though not binding." See also
Herman A. Gray, Some Thoughts on the Use of Precedents in Labor Arbitra-
tion, 6 The Arbitration Journal 135 (1951).
That other awards are or should be "advisory only" see Simkin and
Kennedy, Arbitration of Grievances, U.S. Dept. of Labor Bull. No. 82 (1946);
"Use the experience not the result," Kheel, 1 (N.S.) The Arbitration Journal
423 (1946); "But it will be a bold arbitrator who will assert that he can derive
no assistance from a reading of the opinion of his fellows," Note, 1949 Wash.
U.L.Q. Rev. 71 (1949); "Studied and given consideration"; Syme, The Function
of Arbitrator's Opinions, 6 The Arbitration Journal 103 (1951). Of course,
those who publish awards think they have value as a guide. See Prentice-
Hall Labor Course 13,173 (1948). To the contrary see Abelow, Arbitration
of Labor Disputes-Some Practical Aspects, 14 Brooklyn L. Rev. 28, 30 (1947):
"... rarely will one arbitrator consider other decisions as precedents to be
followed."
"When an arbitrator permits himself to be influenced by consistency
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two hundred twenty-four arbitration awards were reported. Of
these, sixty-six contained citations of other awards. Apparently,
of these, one hundred twelve of the cited awards were considered
authority in part for the decisions in which they were cited. Of
the awards cited, forty-two were distinguished or not followed.
But other awards were, it will be seen, cited in over twenty-five
per cent of the awards made.
The authors' own convictions are that the citation of awards
between other parties in a pending arbitration is justified25 and
may be effective. The arbitrator should give the cited awards
consideration. If the award is not in point, it should be clearly
distinguished and the reasons for its inapplicability stated. If
the arbitrator feels the award is in point but is incorrect or inap-
plicable, he should of course not follow it; but the parties should
be given some explanation of the reason why the other arbi-
trator's award is not appropriate for application in the present
case.
Should the arbitrator himself seek enlightenment in pub-
lished reports of awards? At present, the role of precedent in
the arbitration process is too unsettled to make this appear advis-
able to the authors. Where one party or the other has offered
citation of authority, there is ample warning that both parties
may attack with the same weapon. For the arbitrator, in the
absence of such warning, to resort to aid in the ideas of others
may be so unsettling to the parties that here at least the ostrich
had better keep his head buried until someone insists that it be
raised by a whack on the tail feathers.
No system of jurisprudence or of administration has ever
developed which has succeeded in disregarding completely all
rather than by justice, it will be a sad day indeed." Carlston, Arbitration, An
Institutional Procedure, 4 (N.S.) The Arbitration Journal 248, 251 (1949);
McPherson, Should Labor Arbitrators Play Follow-the-Leader? 4 (N.S.) The
Arbitration Journal 163 (1949): "Citation, if seriously undertaken by two
parties might well develop into an endurance contest."
See Arbitration Sets Its Standards for Conduct in Labor-Management
Arbitration, 6 Arbitration Journal 6 (1951). Procedural Standards for Arbi-
trators, § 4(f), supra note 8. See Rule 25, Standards of Practice for Arbitra-
tion, American Arbitration Association; Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, 1
(N.S.) The Arbitration Journal 206 (1946).
See Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (1948).
25. See Arbitration Sets Its Standards for Conduct in Labor-Management
Arbitration, 6 The Arbitration Journal 6 (1951); Procedural Standards for
Arbitrators, Rule 4(f), supra note 8. See Rule 25, Standards of Practice for
Arbitration, American Arbitration Association, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators,
1 (N.S.) The Arbitration Journal 206 (1946).
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precedent. As a means both of resolving controversy and of
administering working agreements, arbitration cannot escape
completely by playing a "head in the sand" role. This is not to
suggest that the following of precedent should play a fundamental
role in the award. The award itself should rest ultimately on the
equities of the case. Flexibility is far more to be desired than
elaborate consideration of precedent, whether followed or dis-
regardedY6
26. See Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 118 (1948).
